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The adequacy of multilateral surveillance and of the institutions
charged with carrying it out has been cast into doubt by the series of
escalating crises that has punctuated the 1990s. No one questions that
domestic policies have important cross-border repercussions in a world
of interdependent economies. No one questions the prima facie case for
surveillance to foster a consensus on the nature of those repercussions, to
encourage countries to adjust their policies to better take cross-border
spillovers into account, and to monitor governments’ compliance with
the terms of their agreements. But the adequacy of existing mechanisms
for discharging these functions has come under a cloud following the
European currency crisis of 1992–93, the Tequila crisis of 1994–95, the
Asian crisis of 1997, and the global emerging-markets crisis of 1998, and
as a result of the inability of the ofﬁcial community to do much about
either the causes or the consequences of ﬁnancial crises.
These recognitions are evident in the drumbeat of criticism directed
at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and in calls to convene a new
Bretton Woods Conference. But these same statements are revealing of
the absence of agreement about how to strengthen surveillance and, in
particular, to better avert and manage crises. Respectable voices call for
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they would prefer.expanding the IMF, shrinking the IMF, merging it with the World Bank
and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), spinning off its surveil-
lance and lending functions to regional monetary funds, and even
abolishing the institution. The vague and peculiar nature of the term
“international ﬁnancial architecture,” used to denote the entity that is the
object of this reformist effort, is further revealing of the lack of deﬁnition
that characterizes the debate.
This paper marshals some suggestions of where to go from here. The
ﬁrst section focuses on surveillance qua surveillance. There I consider the
need for a major push in the area of international standards as the
centerpiece for multilateral surveillance in the twenty-ﬁrst century, high-
lighting what I see as the shortcomings of ofﬁcial initiatives in this area.
I then describe an idea for reforming the IMF to make it a more effective
vessel for the surveillance function. The next section turns from crisis
prevention to crisis management and considers how to make the Fund a
more effective crisis manager and the prospects for expanding private
sector burden-sharing when a crisis strikes. The third section discusses
the role of policies toward the capital account and the exchange rate. The
fourth is a skeptical aside on the economics and politics of regional funds.
The ﬁnal section, in concluding, sketches the policy agenda going forward.
SURVEILLANCE
The IMF has been criticized for expanding its surveillance and
conditionality from the monetary, ﬁscal, and exchange rate policies that
are its traditional bread and butter to prudential supervision, auditing
and accounting, bankruptcy procedures, corporate governance, and
competition policy, among other issues. Its intrusion into everything from
the Suharto family’s clove monopoly to Indonesia’s national car program
is attacked as invasive, unnecessary, and counterproductive (Feldstein
1998; Rodrik 1999). It is invasive because it interferes with the traditional
prerogatives of sovereign states. It is unnecessary, in the view of the
critics, because microeconomic and structural conditions are inappropri-
ate for dealing with currency and ﬁnancial crises that are essentially
macroeconomic in nature. And it is counterproductive because different
institutional arrangements are appropriate for different economic, legal,
and cultural settings and because ignoring this, and trampling on
national prerogatives, run the risk of provoking a populist backlash.
The Case for Standards1
The counterargument is that high capital mobility makes it impos-
sible to ﬁx the international ﬁnancial system without ﬁrst ﬁxing the
1 The arguments of this subsection are taken from Eichengreen (1999), where they are
elaborated in much more detail.
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International ﬁnancial stability requires domestic ﬁnancial stability, given
the scope for ﬁnancial problems to spill across borders. And domestic
ﬁnancial stability can only be attained through institutional reform. This
is why Feldstein’s conclusion, that the IMF should stick to giving advice
on monetary and ﬁscal policies and avoid meddling in the other internal
arrangements of countries, will not do.
Stabilizing a country’s ﬁnancial system requires institutional reforms
extending well beyond policies toward external trade and payments. Few
would question that creating a stable ﬁnancial environment presupposes
disclosure requirements for banks and corporations to make available the
information required for market discipline to work, and prudential
supervision to compensate for the shortcomings of banks’ and ﬁrms’ own
risk-management practices.2 In a world of information asymmetries and
highly leveraged institutions, in which ﬁnancial crises can spread conta-
giously, the international community has a common interest in seeing
that all countries active on international markets adopt minimally accept-
able domestic arrangements in these areas.
Some will argue that this is as far as the IMF and the international
community should go in intruding into countries’ internal affairs. I ﬁnd it
impossible to resist the conclusion that they must go further—that the
need for domestic institutional reforms with implications for the stability
of international ﬁnancial markets extends beyond this point. It extends to
the use of internationally recognized auditing and accounting practices,
in whose absence lenders will be unable to accurately assess the ﬁnancial
condition of the banks and corporations to which they lend. It extends to
effective creditor rights, in whose absence claimants will be unable to
monitor and control the economic and ﬁnancial decisions of managers. It
extends to investor-protection laws to prevent insider trading, market
cornering, and related practices, in whose absence securities markets will
not develop. It extends to fair and expeditious corporate bankruptcy
procedures, without which debt problems can cascade from borrower to
borrower. Countries can satisfy these desiderata in different ways, but in
a world of capital market integration there is no avoiding the need to
satisfy them.
The fear, however, is that international pressure for reform will force
all emerging markets to don what Thomas Friedman (1999) refers to as
the “golden straitjacket,” denying them the opportunity to design regu-
latory institutions sensitive to their distinctive economic, cultural, and
legal traditions. This is where standards come in. International standards,
which deﬁne criteria that must be met by all countries but permit them to
satisfy them in different ways, offer a way of reconciling the common
2 And to take systemic risk into account.
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existence of diverse domestic economic systems and traditions.3 The
complaint that the IMF’s structural interventions are arbitrary and
capricious at least partly explains the backlash they have provoked; with
the promulgation of standards, an objective set of criteria will exist, to
which the Fund can refer when it demands structural reform.
Realism requires acknowledging that neither the IMF nor the G-7’s
newly created Financial Stability Forum possesses the competence and
resources required to design detailed international standards in all the
relevant areas. This is where my recommendations depart from those of
the ofﬁcial community. I favor relying as heavily as possible on the
private sector: on the International Accounting Standards Committee, the
International Federation of Accountants, the International Organization
of Supreme Audit Institutions, Committee J of the International Bar
Association, and the International Corporate Governance Network,
among others. Most of these self-organizing bodies include a full com-
plement of emerging-market members; some also have subcommittees
concerned with issues particularly relevant to emerging markets. The
multilaterals should of course participate in the deliberations of these
bodies as a way of taking “ownership” of the standards they set. But the
private sector must take the lead.
Promulgating standards is one thing, enforcing them another. Effec-
tive market discipline will require someone to issue blunt assessments of
national practice. Each self-organizing body should be encouraged to rate
countries’ compliance with its standards and to establish an electronic
bulletin board where such information can be centralized. Hyperlinks
should be provided to the Fund’s own electronic bulletin board (as they
already are, to a limited degree, for macroeconomic and ﬁnancial data).
Where the self-organizing committee is composed of national regulators,
the rating function could still be privatized; it could be spun off to
commercial concerns like Fitch-IBCA. If the assessments made by these
private-sector bodies are subject to the kind of criticism presently levied
at credit-rating agencies—namely, that changes in their evaluations lag
changes in market conditions—then the IMF will have to take on the
compliance-evaluation function itself. The best way for it to do so would
be by publishing an annual report in which it rated each of its members’
compliance in each of the relevant subareas (perhaps in conjunction with
its annual or biannual Article IV consultations, and with help from the
3 None of this is to deny that compromise will be required. Indeed, not just emerging
markets but the United States itself will be forced to compromise for signiﬁcant progress to
be achieved. Thus, U.S. reservations about the adequacy of the currently proposed
international accounting standards, whether parochial or even well justiﬁed, hardly
encourage other countries to sign on to an agreement that it itself resists.
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span, the IMF will have to reinforce market discipline by offering the
carrot of concessionary interest rates on its loans to countries that comply
and by conditioning its programs on steps to bring national practice into
conformance.5
An Independent and Accountable IMF
Unfortunately one worries that the IMF, for the same reasons that it
has been reluctant to criticize its members’ exchange rate and macroeco-
nomic policies, will hesitate to criticize them for failing to meet these
newly promulgated international ﬁnancial standards. The Fund, as a
political animal, ﬁnds it hard to call its members to task. National
governments, which are its shareholders and ultimately call the shots,
ﬁnd it hard to criticize other national governments. They are reluctant to
point out shortcomings in national policies for fear of embarrassing
foreign heads of state.
This is a speciﬁc instance of a more general problem—that IMF
decisionmaking is excessively politicized. Excessive weight tends to be
attached to national interests, interfering with the IMF’s ability to pursue
its broader social mandate. It has been argued, for example, that several
of the Fund’s recent programs, like those for Mexico, serve the interests
of creditor countries by providing ﬁnancial assistance that allowed
foreign portfolio investors to be repaid at the expense of the taxpayers of
the crisis country. Here the implication is that IMF policies were used to
advance creditor interests, at the expense of future moral hazard and
considerable cost to the Mexican taxpayer. It is similarly argued that in an
effort to prop up a presumably reform-minded government and to keep
extremists who could not be trusted with the country’s nuclear capability
from coming to power, the U.S. government arm-twisted the Fund into
agreeing to continued disbursements for Russia in 1997–98, despite
evidence that economic and ﬁnancial reform there had gone off track.
Again, the implication is that IMF policies were used to further U.S.
security objectives rather than in the pursuit of ﬁnancial stability, thus
aggravating moral hazard rather than furthering reform. It is argued that
4 This would appear to be the British Government’s preferred approach to this aspect
of the international ﬁnancial architecture. The Fund has begun to explore the feasibility of
this task by carrying out a series of pilot reports (“experimental studies in transparency”).
5 There remains the question of whether these incentives will be enough. Only a
fraction of IMF member countries are subject to a program at any point in time, and there
are good reasons to question whether market discipline will be prompt and systematic in its
application. This creates an argument for reinforcing these other incentives to comply by
having national regulators key capital requirements for foreign lending to whether the IMF
rates the borrowing country as in compliance with the relevant international ﬁnancial
standards.
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crisis countries to open their ﬁnancial markets and distribution systems to
foreign competition, served the interests of advanced industrial countries
seeking market access more than the crisis countries themselves.
If the problem is that the Fund’s decisions are distorted by the
parochial concerns of national governments, then greater independence
from those governments is the logical solution. The obvious way of
achieving this is by amending the Articles of Agreement to enhance the
independence of the Executive Board, as argued in de Gregorio et al.
(1999). Executive Directors could still be appointed by national govern-
ments or groups of governments, just as central bank governors in some
federal systems are appointed by state or regional governments. But if
Directors are too inclined to take advice from those governments, then
the Articles should be amended to discourage them from doing so. If the
Statute of the European System of Central Banks prohibits members of
the ECB Board from taking advice from their governments, in other
words, why shouldn’t the IMF’s Articles of Agreement impose the same
prohibition on Executive Directors?6
Many readers will object that doing so would vest too much power
in an all-powerful board of monetary technocrats. This worry could be
addressed by amending the Articles to give Directors an explicit man-
date, and by insisting on greater transparency, notably by requiring more
decisions to be taken on the basis of up-or-down votes and releasing the
results. In addition, Directors should be required to explain their deci-
sions, and the substance of Board discussions should be made public. If
Directors have idiosyncratic objectives, greater transparency of decision-
making will reveal their hidden agendas, which will in turn strengthen
their incentives to pursue the Fund’s mandate. Directors’ ultimate
constituencies will then be able to judge whether their representatives
supported or resisted a particular Fund policy, and Directors, rather than
going along to get along, will have an incentive to register their dissents.
Ultimately, a speciﬁc body must have the power to hold the
6 Statutory independence may not be enough; effective independence may require an
amendment to the Articles specifying that Directors will be appointed to multiyear terms of
ofﬁce and creating high hurdles to their dismissal. Their independence will be strengthened
if they receive adequate compensation. (History suggests that this should not be a problem.)
It may be desirable to include a provision barring them from moving laterally into
government or ﬁnance for a speciﬁed period following their term on the Board (although
enforcement of such a provision would not be straightforward). True independence may in
addition require budgetary independence. All large international rescue packages in the
1990s have been cobbled together out of contributions from the IMF, other multilaterals, and
national governments. Given the rapid expansion of international liquidity, IMF resources
alone have not been enough. The Fund’s dependence on ﬁnancial supplementation from
national governments would be another check on the institution’s independent Directors. It
may be desirable, therefore, to amend the Articles of Agreement to give the Fund the option
of borrowing on the market, subject to the concurrence of a supermajority of the Board.
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Committee. Individual Directors or even the entire Board could be
dismissed by a supermajority vote of the Interim Committee.7 The French
government, among others, has suggested vesting additional power with
the Interim Committee as a way of reinvigorating the Fund. Making
provision for the Interim Committee to hold Directors accountable is a
way of achieving this goal without politicizing the activities of the Fund.8
Is this proposal realistic? More than a few readers will be inclined to
dismiss it as quixotic. But who could have imagined a few years ago how
many countries would have moved to establish independent central
banks? In an age when some observers call for abolishing the IMF and
others recommend creating a “true international lender of last resort,”
enhancing the independence of its Board is a limited reform. For those
who recognize that ﬁnancial markets are imperfect and acknowledge that
those imperfections create the need for an institution to backstop the
markets, but who at the same time worry that national agendas too often
distort IMF decisionmaking, this is a logical way to proceed.
CRISIS RESPONSE
Amending the Articles of Agreement to enhance the independence of
the Board also speaks to the concern that the IMF is too inclined to
provide support for unsustainable currency pegs and to let private
investors off the hook. If the temptation is always to provide one more
bailout now and worry about the consequent moral hazard later, then the
solution—by analogy with Rogoff’s (1985) argument for delegating
monetary policy to conservative central bankers to offset the inﬂationary
bias imparted by the time inconsistency of optimal policy—is to delegate
decisionmaking to independent Executive Directors temperamentally
disinclined to bail.
7 Requiring a supermajority (members of the Interim Committee holding 80 per cent of
quotas and votes in the Fund, for example) would protect Directors against arbitrary
dismissal and buttress their political independence but at the same time hold them
accountable to their mandate and apply sanctions in the event of dereliction of duty.
8 Other reforms of the Interim Committee may also be desirable. In fact, a variety of
sensible proposals are already on the table (courtesy of the British and Italian governments,
among others). In particular, strengthening the legitimacy of the Interim Committee and the
Fund more generally may require updating quota and constituency systems to take into
account ongoing changes in the world economy, from rapid economic growth in Asia
(which should increase the representation of that region) to monetary uniﬁcation in Europe
(which, by eliminating balance-of-payments problems among its members, should reduce
its representation). The IMF’s review of quotas, now under way, provides an opportunity to
take a ﬁrst step in this direction.
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Thoughtful Executive Directors, whether independent or not, need
guidelines for how and when to intervene. I believe that two circum-
stances justify IMF intervention, and these in turn call for the creation of
two different IMF facilities.
Moral hazard may always be with us, but the concern attached to it
by observers of IMF policy waxes and wanes. Concern seems to have
peaked following the Mexican and Asian crises, when the IMF relaxed its
rules governing the size of rescue packages and disbursements reached
unprecedented levels, as international investors (in what they referred to
as the “moral hazard play”) poured money into Russia in the expectation
that, if debt-servicing difﬁculties developed, the Fund would respond
with additional ﬁnance.9 When Russia unexpectedly defaulted and
investors took losses, this assurance was shattered. Commentators began
to question whether the decisions of international investors were really so
strongly distorted by the readiness of the IMF to backstop the market.10
Moreover, the severity of the credit crunch that developed in the autumn
of 1998 and the perceived threat to the stability of global ﬁnancial markets
made even the U.S. Congress, previously reluctant to agree to an increase
in IMF quotas, recognize that moral hazard was not the sole consider-
ation. Rather, sensible policy requires balancing moral hazard risk against
meltdown risk.
Doing so means proceeding as follows. First, moral hazard must be
limited by putting the genie of ever-bigger bailouts back in the bottle.
Occasions when the IMF should assist a country experiencing a sudden
reversal in capital ﬂows will continue to occur. Such assistance may be
justiﬁed to support demand and production and minimize the severity of
the recession while resources are shifted from the nontraded- to the
traded-goods sector. It may be justiﬁed to give the government the
resources needed to recapitalize an insolvent banking system. It may
even be justiﬁed to permit the government to repay selected foreign
creditors whose goodwill is viewed as essential for the maintenance of
credit market access. But the Fund cannot countenance ever bigger
bailouts to pay off ever more numerous foreign creditors, or it will create
a truly unsupportable moral hazard problem.
The solution is for the Fund to resume its earlier policy of loaning a
country no more than 100 percent of quota in a year and 300 percent over
three years.11 In addition to addressing moral hazard, this would deal
with the fact that the Fund’s resources are chronically inadequate to
9 A compendium of warnings to this effect is to be found in McQuillan and
Montgomery (1999).
10 See, for example, Institute of International Finance (1999).
11 Except under exceptional circumstances, as detailed below.
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there to help a government carry out its core functions, it would not
always sufﬁce to pay off all existing creditors, thus preventing the moral
hazard problem from getting out of hand. Again, the Articles of Agree-
ment could be amended to eliminate the facilities and provisions that
allow exceptions to this rule. If the feeling of shareholders is that the
growth of capital markets requires growth in IMF packages, then they
should address this directly by using existing mechanisms to agree to a
quota increase. In this connection, it would be important to change the
way quotas are allocated, placing a higher weight on international capital
transactions and a lower weight on current transactions.13 But the bottom
line is that loans for addressing country problems should be limited.
Systemic problems, which pose a threat to the stability of global
ﬁnancial markets, are another matter. To address these problems, the
Fund needs a “contagion window” to provide short-term emergency
loans to countries with fundamentally strong policies at risk of being
destabilized by adverse ﬁnancial developments abroad.14 It now pos-
sesses something along these lines in the form of its awkwardly named
Contingent Credit Facility (established by the Executive Board at the end
of April 1999). To access this facility, countries have to demonstrate that
their policies are fundamentally sound, that they are suffering from
events affecting international capital markets originating in other parts of
the world, and that the problem is temporary. They will be allowed to
access this facility more quickly than other IMF loans, and disbursements
will be large and front-loaded. Repayment maturities will be short.
Interest rates will be high, to discourage excessive recourse to the facility.
It is too early to tell whether the Contingent Credit Facility will be
good, bad, or irrelevant. If the conditions for access are very tightly
enforced, the CCF may never be activated, in which case it will prove
irrelevant. If, on the other hand, those conditions are loosely enforced, it
may turn out to be a serious engine for moral hazard. Thus, we need a
Goldilocks policy, neither too hot nor too cold. To continue with the
metaphor, the proof of the porridge will be in the eating.
12 This follows in part from the fact that only a fraction of the currencies in which
countries subscribe are usable in the Fund’s international operations. Presumably this
problem will moderate as more countries graduate to the club of middle- and high-income
members with stable ﬁnances and convertible currencies.
13 The IMF has recently commissioned a study of how the allocation of quotas should
be changed to better reﬂect changes in the world economy. Updating that formula would
strengthen the legitimacy of returning to a quota-based policy of regular access.
14 Note that this differs from existing General Arrangements to Borrow/New Arrange-
ments to Borrow (GAB/NAB) arrangements, which govern IMF resources rather than IMF
disbursements and may be activated to deal with the problems of a country that is the
source of the threat to the international system rather than the victim.
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A credible commitment by the IMF not to automatically run to the
rescue of a country that would otherwise ﬁnd it impossible to keep
current on its obligations presupposes the existence of a tolerable
alternative mechanism for dealing with outstanding debts. It is easy to say
that the Fund should no longer bail out governments and their creditors,
but it is hard not to do so as long as other reasonable ways of addressing
ﬁnancial problems do not exist. The shortcoming of existing arrange-
ments is that they make workouts excessively difﬁcult. Many interna-
tional bonds include provisions requiring the unanimous consent of
bondholders to the terms of a restructuring agreement, creating an
incentive for “vultures” to buy up the outstanding debt and hold the
process hostage by threatening legal action. Unlike syndicated bank
loans, most such bonds lack sharing clauses requiring individual credi-
tors to share with other bondholders any amounts recovered from the
borrower and thereby discouraging recourse to lawsuits.
Those who believe that countries may have to take occasional
recourse to suspensions and subsequent restructurings argue that these
provisions in bond covenants should be modiﬁed. Majority voting and
sharing clauses would discourage maverick investors from resorting to
lawsuits and other ways of obstructing settlements beneﬁcial to the debtor
and the majority of creditors alike. Collective representation clauses, which
specify who represents the bondholders and make provision for a bond-
holders’ committee or meeting, would allow orderly decisions to be reached.
Use of such clauses was suggested in 1996 by the G-10 in its post-Mexico
report and echoed in a series of recent G-22 and G-7 reports and
declarations.15 In February of this year the G-7 placed the issue on its
work program for reforming the international ﬁnancial system, with the
goal of reaching a consensus by the Cologne Summit in June.
If this is a good idea, why then have the markets not done it already?
One answer is moral hazard. Neither debtors nor creditors may wish to
weaken the bonding role of debt by altering loan agreements in ways that
might tempt borrowers to walk away from their obligations. Making it
easier for debtors to restructure might cause investors to fear that the
debtor was prepared to do so at the ﬁrst sign of trouble and prompt them
to liquidate their holdings of its securities, precipitating precisely the kind
of bond-market crisis that the international policy community is con-
cerned to avoid.
But if the bonding role of debt was the be-all and end-all, we would
also abolish domestic bankruptcy procedures and reinstitute debtors’
prison to prevent domestic borrowers from ever defaulting on their
15 See Group of Ten (1996), Group of Twenty-Two (1998) and Group of Seven (1998),
respectively.
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debtors to walk away from their obligations against the efﬁciency advan-
tages, for debtors and creditors alike, of clearing away unviable debt
overhangs and restoring the ﬁnancial health of fundamentally viable enter-
prises. The argument for collective action clauses in bond covenants is an
argument for establishing a similar balance in the international bond market.
Majority voting, sharing, and non-acceleration may make it easier to rene-
gotiate defaulted debts, but if this permits a long deadlock to be avoided,
investors will have no reason to shun bonds with these features.16
A better explanation for why the market has not solved the problem
is adverse selection. It is an intrinsic feature of the capital market that
lenders know less than borrowers about the latter’s willingness and
ability to pay. Hence, for the same reason that only patients who
anticipate succumbing to a fatal disease will buy expensive life insurance,
only countries that anticipate with high probability having to restructure
their debts may wish to issue securities with these provisions. Left to its
own devices, neither market may function. The danger is that adverse
selection would render the market in these modiﬁed bonds illiquid and
thereby impair the ability of emerging economies to borrow.
The G-10’s 1996 report, where the idea of collective action clauses
was ﬁrst mooted, said little about this dilemma. While acknowledging the
ﬁrst-mover problem and suggesting that ofﬁcial support for contractual
innovation should be provided “as appropriate,” it failed to specify
concrete steps to be taken by the authorities. The G-22 subsequently
recommended that unnamed governments, presumably those of the
United States and United Kingdom, should “examine” the use of such
clauses in their own sovereign bond issues. The G-7 recommended that
its members should “consider” them. Treasury Secretary Rubin, in a
speech designed to set the tone for the Interim Committee’s April 1999
meeting, reiterated that the international community should “encourage”
their broader use.17 But the ofﬁcial community needs to do more than
examine, consider, and encourage. Given the adverse selection problem,
progress is unlikely without the introduction of legislation and regula-
tions in the creditor countries. And without progress on this front, the
international community will lack credibility when it insists that it will
not automatically run to the rescue of crisis-stricken countries.
16 To be sure, this is no panacea. Private placements would not be affected. New
provisions could be added to existing loans only through a voluntary exchange of existing
bonds for new ones. Not only might some bondholders resist, but any one country that
attempted to ﬁrst carry out the exchange might be seen as signaling that it was contem-
plating imminent default and precipitate a crisis. The average term to maturity of
international bonds may be on the order of ﬁve years, but some have as long as 20 years to
run. All this means the incorporation of sharing, majority-voting, non-acceleration, and
minimum-legal-threshold provisions into bond covenants will be slow. But slow progress is
better than no progress.
17 See Rubin (1999).
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the inclusion of majority-representation, sharing, non-acceleration, min-
imum-legal-action threshold, and collective-representation clauses to
international bonds a condition for admission to domestic markets. It
should provide an incentive for countries to do so by indicating that it is
prepared to lend at more attractive interest rates to countries that issue
debt securities featuring these provisions.18 U.S. and U.K. regulators, for
their part, could make the admission of international bonds to their
markets a function of whether those bonds contain the relevant sharing,
majority-voting, minimum legal threshold, and collective representation
provisions. They could include these same provisions in their own debt
instruments.
Short-term bank credits are a thornier issue. They tend not to be
governed by contracts, making it harder to deal with them by contractual
innovation. Litan et al. (1998) have suggested somehow requiring coun-
tries to pass legislation that would provide for an automatic reduction of
the principal of all foreign currency loans extended to banks in their
countries that are not rolled over in the event of a crisis. Foreign creditors
could get still out, but only at a loss. The prospect of that loss would
strengthen their incentive to stay in, to address their collective action
problem, and to restructure the debt.
The danger is that this approach could precipitate the very crises that
the authorities are concerned to avoid. Banks anticipating that they might
wish to get out in the near future but that they could do so only at a loss
would scramble out today. A government decree that all foreign bank
credits had to be forceably rolled over or written down would be much
more disruptive to the markets than collective action clauses in individ-
ual bond contracts, which would come into play at the discretion of the
individual borrower(s) and lender(s).
The problem remains of what to do about short-term bank-to-bank
credits, whose ﬂightiness can threaten the stability of the domestic
banking system. Gaining voluntary agreement of the banks to roll over
their credits, as in Korea at the end of 1997, is desirable when possible, but
possible it will not always be.19 The best solution, I will argue, is to avoid
18 The Fund has recently signaled its willingness to do so by mentioning the adoption
of collective action clauses as one of the criteria that it will consider when determining
whether or not countries qualify for its Contingent Credit Facility.
19 The special circumstances that made this possible in Korea are unlikely to be
replicated. Korea had the advantage of a newly elected democratic government committed
to pushing through economic reforms. Where the government has less credibility and
concerted lending is seen as relieving the pressure for economic adjustment and reform,
foreign creditors may not be so inclined to stay in. In addition, the sovereign guarantee
extended ﬁrst to Korean banks and then to the bonds into which the bank credits were
converted was viable only by virtue of the sovereign’s relatively light debt load, an
advantage that not all governments will enjoy.
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now develop this point.
POLICIES TOWARD THE EXCHANGE RATE
AND THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT
The single most robust leading indicator of crisis risk in emerging
markets is short-term external debt, the short-term external debt of the
banking system in particular.20 Short-term debt is liquid, and if investors
choose to liquidate it, serious ﬁnancial problems can arise. When the debt
in question is debt of the banking system, whose assets are relatively
illiquid (by deﬁnition, since banks are in the business of providing
intermediation services to segments of the economy about which publicly
available information is least complete), the result can be bank runs and
banking crises. The consequences are especially disruptive in developing
countries, where the informational prerequisites for securitized markets
are lacking and banks dominate the market in intermediation services.
Policies Toward the Capital Account
Central banks and governments address this problem by providing
deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort services. But the central bank
cannot print the foreign exchange needed to pay off foreign depositors.
This is where IMF loans come in, of course, but it is also where they create
moral hazard. The dilemma is stark: The expectation of large IMF support
packages will encourage an excessive dependence on short-term foreign
funding, but the absence of large IMF support packages will leave the
lender of last resort powerless in the face of ﬂight by foreign-currency
depositors.
In the best of all worlds, banks would internalize these risks, hedging
their exposures and avoiding excessive dependence on risky short-term
foreign funding. In a second-best world, domestic regulators would
require them to limit their exposures, close their positions, and manage
their risks. But in the real world, where too few banks can adequately
manage risk and too few regulators have the capacity to correct these
deﬁciencies, it may be necessary to intervene directly with policies
designed to prevent excessive reliance on short-term foreign funding.
Capital requirements can be used on both the borrowing and lending
sides to apply appropriate incentives, although there are reasons to worry
about their effectiveness in politicized environments where capital is all
too rarely written down. Holding-period taxes a ` la Chile can be used to
20 For evidence, see Frankel and Rose (1996) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999). Note that
these authors deﬁne crises in entirely different ways but reach very similar conclusions.
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universal in coverage.21 The lesson of Thailand is that simply requiring
the banks to close their positions may only encourage them to shift the
foreign-currency exposure to corporates, who are no better able to handle
it. The bottom line is that short-term, foreign-currency-denominated debt
is a time bomb waiting to explode, and that holding-period taxes on all
capital inﬂows are the appropriate way of defusing it, until which time
markets deepen and risk-management (and regulatory) practices develop
to the point where the private sector (and the regulators) can be relied on
to manage the risk.
More generally, this perspective suggests that caution should be the
watchword when opening the capital account, at the short end in
particular. The worst of all possible policies were those followed by
Thailand and South Korea before the crisis; they encouraged bank
borrowing abroad at the expense of other foreign borrowing and short-
term foreign funding over inward foreign direct investment and corpo-
rate bond ﬂotations. The now standard lesson from the Asian crisis—that
exposing badly regulated banks to an open capital account is akin to
offering a recovering alcoholic a drink—implies the need to upgrade bank
regulation but also to “go slow” in opening the capital account.
Policies Toward the Exchange Rate
The other way to discourage banks and corporates from developing
an excessive dependence on short-term, unhedged foreign debt is by
pursuing policies of greater exchange rate ﬂexibility. Allowing the
exchange rate to ﬂuctuate is the only credible way of encouraging agents
to hedge their exposures. A pegged rate provides an irresistible incentive
for the private sector to accumulate unhedged foreign debts. To defend
the peg, the government is inevitably forced to insist that there is
absolutely no prospect that it will change. How many CFOs will then be
rewarded for purchasing costly exchange-rate insurance before the fact?
If the currency is allowed to ﬂuctuate on a day-to-day basis, banks and
21 The Chilean authorities discovered, among other things, that limits on bank
borrowing abroad simply encouraged the mining companies to borrow for the banks and
on-lend the proceeds. The debate over the effectiveness of these taxes is enormous. Some
critics complain that evasion remains a problem. Others observe the lack of evidence that
Chile’s taxes limited the overall level of foreign borrowing. The second objection can be
dismissed on the grounds that the goal was never to limit the overall level of foreign
borrowing but to alter its average maturity, and on the maturity front the evidence is
compelling (see Hernandez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) for the deﬁnitive analysis). As for
the ﬁrst objection, it is important to recall that such a measure, to effectively lengthen the
maturity structure of the debt, need not be evasion free. The last word on this subject should
go to Chile’s ﬁnance minister, who has asked (I paraphrase), “If these capital-import taxes
are so easily evaded, then why do we have so many non-interest-bearing foreign deposits
at the central bank?”
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purchase insurance against currency swings.22 Then, when the exchange
rate does move by an unexpectedly large amount, they will not be thrust
into bankruptcy by the increase in the cost of servicing short-term foreign
debts. A currency crash will not automatically mean a ﬁnancial crash, as
it did in Indonesia in 1998, for example, and the greater stability of the
domestic ﬁnancial system will in turn stabilize the exchange rate.
All of this assumes the existence of an active interbank market in
currency forwards and an exchange-based market in futures. Greater
exchange rate ﬂexibility provides an incentive for the development of
these markets, although prudent governments will use their regulatory
powers to provide further encouragement. This is one illustration of how
the adoption of a more ﬂexible exchange rate should encourage the
development of a more resilient, crisis-resistant ﬁnancial system.
The other side of this coin is more limited access to foreign capital. A
ﬂuctuating currency makes it less attractive for foreign investors to lend,
especially in the currency of the borrowing country. Capital ﬂows,
especially short-term portfolio capital ﬂows, are reduced.23 This effect is
apparent in the strikingly low correlation of savings and investment in
particular regions of larger countries, in contrast to the much higher
correlations for countries as a whole.24 Another way to put the point is
that a ﬂuctuating (or potentially ﬂuctuating) currency, which discourages
foreign investors from lending in the currency of the borrowing country,
also limits the ability of banks and ﬁrms to hedge their foreign-currency
exposures in the aggregate. They can reshufﬂe those exposures so as to
avoid dangerous concentrations, but the overall level of foreign-currency
exposure is a given. Greater exchange rate ﬂexibility, which creates an
incentive to hedge these risks, shows up in a lower overall level of foreign
borrowing.
Some countries may therefore want to go all the way in the other
direction, to dollarization or the creation of a currency board, to obtain
22 Montiel (1999) cites Colombia and Chile in the early 1990s as examples of cases where
greater exchange rate ﬂexibility worked to discourage short-term, unhedged foreign
borrowing. To be clear, the argument is not that central banks and governments should
follow policies of benign neglect toward the exchange rate. Freely ﬂoating rates are
unattractive to most emerging markets, since their economies are small, their ﬁnancial
markets are shallow, and their exports are disproportionately concentrated in a few
commodities. Governments may still want to intervene to damp down currency ﬂuctua-
tions. My argument is that they will have to learn to intervene less and that countries with
open capital markets will have to avoid orienting monetary policy around an explicit
exchange rate target, which ends up creating one-way bets for currency speculators. I return
to the currency-board exception below.
23 For evidence, see again the case studies discussed by Montiel (1999) and the
econometrics of Bachetta and van Wincoop (1998).
24 Bayoumi and Rose (1993) provide evidence of this for the regions of the United
Kingdom, while Bayoumi (1997) does the same for the regions of Canada.
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work means installing a battery of supportive domestic policies. The
banking system must be internationalized to compensate for the absence
of a lender of last resort. The labor market must be made more ﬂexible to
compensate for the absence of the exchange rate as an instrument of
adjustment. Countries that adopt these policies will enjoy freer access to
foreign lending as a result. But the number that are able and willing to go
“whole hog” is likely to remain few.
The story would be different were it possible for Mexico or Argentina
to obtain a seat on the Federal Reserve Board and exert at least some
inﬂuence over the stance of their monetary policy. Knowing that they
retained at least some say over their monetary destinies, Mexicans and
Argentines would be more inclined to embrace dollarization. But the day
when the United States is prepared to grant Mexico or Argentina a seat on
the Federal Open Market Committee, or even extend U.S. bank regulation
and limited lender-of-last-resort services to another country, is still very
far away.
If the United States is not prepared to enter a monetary union with
Argentina, then the latter may instead wish to contemplate one with
Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Importing Brazilian monetary policy may
be no bargain, but a common monetary policy for Mercosur, like a
common monetary policy for Europe, has the potential to create a more
stable monetary zone by virtue of the custom union’s sheer size and
economic diversity.25 Through one avenue or another, some countries
will eventually resolve their dilemma through monetary uniﬁcation. But
if one lesson is to be learned from Argentina’s recent attempt to
encourage the United States to contemplate this option, it is that the day
when the political and economic prerequisites exist for more European-
style monetary unions remains very far away. Monetary uniﬁcation may
be the vision of the future, but more ﬂexible exchange rates are the reality
for today.
REGIONAL MONETARY FUNDS
The idea of an Asia Fund to supplement the IMF was advanced by
the Japanese government following the outbreak of the Asian crisis; it has
been developed further by a number of academics and ofﬁcials.26 At least
four rationales for the approach can be distinguished. While I analyze
them in the Asian context, the conclusions are more general.
25 In other words, a larger, more economically diversiﬁed monetary zone would be less
vulnerable to the world-price shocks that have traditionally destabilized Latin American
economies heavily dependent on exports of a few primary commodities.
26 See Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1999).
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where mutual surveillance has a long history and a procedure by that
name has been enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, is frequently cited as
a case in point. But in contrast with Europe, Asia (like most other regions)
lacks institutions with track records comparable to those of the EU’s
Monetary Committee and Ecoﬁn Council. Nor do Asian countries appear
ready to negotiate an international treaty that makes provision for serious
sanctions and ﬁnes like those of the Maastricht Treaty for countries that
fail to adjust their domestic policies. More fundamentally, Asia lacks the
tradition of integrationist thought and the web of interlocking agree-
ments that work to encourage monetary and ﬁnancial cooperation in
Europe. Asia has no counterpart to the social and political “pillars” of the
Maastricht Treaty to support the application of peer pressure. No wider
web of political and diplomatic agreements exists, to be placed at risk by
a failure to cooperate on monetary and ﬁnancial matters.
A second argument is that, because economic structures and condi-
tions vary by region, neighboring countries have a comparative advan-
tage in diagnosing their distinctive economic problems and crafting
appropriate solutions. All Asian economies have bank-based ﬁnancial
systems and highly geared corporate sectors, which the IMF overlooked,
the argument goes, when prescribing interest-rate hikes to deal with the
crisis; an Asia Fund would not have committed such an egregious error.
This argument seems to me to greatly exaggerate both structural similar-
ities within the region and the ability of policymakers to gain insight into
conditions in neighboring countries from local experience. It is hard to
think of three more structurally different economies than Japan, Indone-
sia, and China, for example.
Third, and related to the preceding, it is argued that the creation of
regional monetary funds will intensify competition in the market for
ideas. If countries in crisis could appeal to both the IMF and a regional
monetary fund whose assistance was conditioned on different policy
actions, then a genuine market in ideas would develop, and only
institutions giving sound advice would be able to retain a customer base.
If it has a poorer understanding of the roots of the Asian crisis and what
measures should be taken to address it than experts employed by the
Asia Fund, the IMF will lose business to its regional competitor. Unfor-
tunately, the analogy with market competition is questionable. In a
competitive economy, the ﬁrm with the best ideas produces the best
product, makes the most proﬁts, and ends up dominating its market. It is
not clear that the same is true of the market in policy advice and ofﬁcial
ﬁnancial assistance. Intergovernmental organizations do not behave like
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. A multilateral that offers inferior advice does
not necessarily end up losing market share and “ﬁling for bankruptcy.”
The IMF is paid before other creditors, whether its advice is good or bad.
It does not follow that a regional fund that lent to governments at
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would more likely than not have its coffers replenished by the high-
income countries that were its principal shareholders.
Fourth and ﬁnally, the fact that the cross-border repercussions of
policies are disproportionately regional is seen as justifying a regional
response.27 Because Asian countries are so heavily export-oriented and
sell into the same markets, they may need additional intergovernmental
credit lines to deal with shared trade-related risks. Because their bank-
based ﬁnancial systems send few price signals (compared to securitized
markets), they may be disproportionately vulnerable to contagious bank
runs and currency crises, thus justifying the creation of a regional
monetary fund. In the same way that a community targeted by burglars
may wish to create a neighborhood watch to supplement the municipal
police force, countries in a region exposed to common risks may wish to
create a fund empowered to provide additional ﬁnancial assistance to one
another.
While analytically sound, this argument is likely to be of limited
practical relevance. The problem pointed up by the Asian crisis is not that
multilateral ﬁnancial assistance is too little; to the contrary, the IMF’s
packages were of unprecedented size. To be sure, authors like Radelet
and Sachs (1998) have criticized IMF assistance as tardy and tranched.
(The Fund doled out its assistance a drop at a time, as the stricken
government showed signs of complying with its conditions.) But it is
unrealistic to assert that a regional fund would behave differently.
Governments are not willing to extend unlimited support to their foreign
counterparts, even when they are the governments of neighboring
countries, without evidence that the latter is prepared to undertake the
adjustment measures needed to pay the money back. Even in Europe,
where the EMS Articles of Agreement technically committed strong-
currency countries to provide unlimited support to their weak-currency
counterparts, the former have in practice refused to freely underwrite the
ﬁnancial needs of the latter. In any case, ever bigger bailouts, whether
supplied by the IMF or a regional monetary fund, are not a sustainable
way of coping with ﬁnancial crises. For those who take the moral hazard
problem seriously, the task at hand is rather to provide an alternative
approach to crisis management and resolution.
Thus, while the idea of regional funds to supplement the crisis-
prevention and crisis-management functions of the IMF has intuitive
appeal, closer scrutiny reveals serious problems with the approach.
27 The evidence and its implications are pursued in Rose (1998).
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In my 1999 book, I argued that the new international ﬁnancial
architecture should be organized around four pillars: international stan-
dards for ﬁnancial arrangements and practices; Chilean-style taxes on
short-term foreign borrowing as a form of prudential regulation to be
imposed until countries have brought other forms of banking-sector
supervision up to world-class levels; greater exchange rate ﬂexibility for
the majority of emerging-market economies; and collective-action clauses
in loan contracts to create an alternative to ever-bigger IMF bailouts. All
four elements have to be adopted simultaneously, I argued, to make the
world a safer ﬁnancial place. The good news is that all four elements are
on the policy agenda. (See Table 1.) Each of them has been embraced by
either Europe or the United States. The bad news is that all four elements
have not been embraced by both Europe and the United States.
International standards are one element on which everyone agrees,
although there is not yet the necessary commitment to working with the
private sector on their promulgation or agreement on steps to encourage
compliance. The United States has endorsed greater exchange rate
ﬂexibility for emerging markets and has expressed sympathy for the use
of Chilean-style capital-inﬂow taxes.28 But it is still reluctant to do more
than utter some encouraging words to bring about the introduction of
collective action clauses into loan agreements. Without the addition of
renegotiation-friendly provisions to loan contracts, the IMF cannot cred-
ibly promise to stand aside when a country is pushed to the brink. And
if the IMF cannot credibly refuse to organize a ﬁnancial rescue, then the
incentives for emerging markets to adopt greater exchange rate ﬂexibility
and short-term inﬂow taxes will remain weak.
European policymakers, for their part, are more concerned about
private sector burden-sharing. They are less reluctant to legislate and
regulate the introduction of new provisions in loan contracts (Jones 1999).
But given their own experience, they are less understanding of the need
for exchange-rate ﬂexibility. And without greater exchange-rate ﬂexibil-
ity, the temptation to engage in excessive short-term foreign borrowing
will remain, and the adverse ﬁnancial consequences of large exchange-
rate changes, when they come, will be all the more devastating. Again,
asserting that the IMF could simply stand aside and let events play
themselves out is not credible.
28 The U.S. position was previewed by Secretary Rubin in his April 21st, 1999, speech,
in which he attempted to signal a new toughness on the need for greater exchange rate
ﬂexibility (the headline in the next day’s Financial Times was “US Urges End to IMF Funds
to Back Pegged Currencies”), and a new sympathy for the use of capital-import taxes. (“Mr.
Rubin also went further than previously in accepting that a Chilean-style tax on short-term
capital inﬂows could be appropriate,” the Financial Times correspondent wrote.)
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G7 Timetable for Reform of the International Financial System
By Spring 1999 meetings of IMF, World Bank, and G7:
c G7 compliance with IMF good practice code on fiscal transparency
c G7 report on strengthening national financial regulation, particularly of highly leveraged
institutions
c IMF to complete manual for implementing fiscal transparency good practice code and to
start monitoring code’s implementation
c IMF (supported by BIS and others) to complete code of best practice for monetary and
financial transparency
c IMF to strengthen data dissemination standards
c Early findings of BIS committees on disclosure standards for private sector financial
institutions and international capital flows
c World Bank/IMF interim report on establishing insolvency and debtor-creditor regimes
c IMF to report on progress of its policy to lend to countries in arrears to their other creditors
c World Bank interim report on development of principles of best practice in social policy
c IMF to report on proposals for it and other international financial institutions to publish
more information
c IMF to report on progress towards formal evaluation mechanism for assessing its own
effectiveness
At G7 Spring meeting: Discuss progress on:
c Proposals to strengthen World Bank and IMF’s Interim and Development Committees
c Examining scope for stronger prudential regulation in industrialised countries and emerging
markets
c Considering necessary elements for maintaining sustainable emerging market exchange
rate regimes
c Developing new crisis response, including new forms of official finance and ways to
include private sector
c Strengthening IMF’s crisis prevention and response procedure
c Policies to protect the most vulnerable in society
By OECD Ministerial meeting in May:
c OECD to complete code of principles for sound corporate governance
By G7 Cologne summit in June:
c G7 to convene first meeting of Financial Stability Forum
c G7 consensus on how to proceed on strengthening national financial regulation,
particularly of highly leveraged institutions
c G7 consensus on how to promote more collective action clauses in bond issues
By end June 1999:
c G7 to disseminate information on government and central bank foreign exchange liquidity
position
By IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting in October:
c IMF and standard-setting bodies to prepare strategy for implementing accounting,
corporate governance, data, and monetary and fiscal policy transparency standards. Joint
paper on this by IMF and World Bank
c IMF to finalise structure for transparency reports
By end 1999:
c G7 report on private sector compliance with corporate governance and accounting
transparency standards
By January 2000:
c G7 to comply with strengthened IMF data dissemination standard
Others:
c G7 compliance with best practice code on monetary and financial policy transparency,
once code is agreed
c IMF to continue policies of trade liberalisation, eliminating soft loans by states to favored
industries and non-discriminatory insolvency regimes
Source: Financial Times, February 22, 1999, p. 5.
224 Barry J. EichengreenThus, the task for the short term is to reconcile these differences
within the G-7 and to bring the emerging markets into the architecture
dialogue. Looking further into the future, it is possible to envisage more
radical reform at both the national and international levels. Some
countries may want to contemplate dollarization, so long as they are truly
prepared to put in place the entire constellation of economic and ﬁnancial
policies needed for it to work. They may want to contemplate the
formation of monetary unions, so that those who wish to eliminate the
problem of exchange-rate risk are not reduced to the status of passengers
who are permitted to ride in the car but never to drive. They may want
to amend the Articles of Agreement of the IMF to create a Fund capable
of making credible commitments and of carrying out its mandate without
succumbing to political pressures. But these are reforms for the future, to
be undertaken after completing the tasks at hand.
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